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It has been said that “for a lawyer to fight against the abuse of human rights is to 
engage in the most important fight of all”,1 and that “The United Nations Charter 
... makes it clear that in this modem age a state’s treatment of its own citizens is 
a matter of international concern.”2 This is nowhere more true than in the case 
of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Romania. 
Lawyers inside and outside Romania and the international community as a whole 
have a role to play in assisting Romania’s evolution into a democratic society and 
monitoring its observation of the rule of law.
This paper will examine past and present human rights abuses in Romania, the 
role of law in human rights and the role of the international community with 
respect to human rights. It will consider the progress being made to eliminate 
human rights abuses in post-revolutionary Romania and attempt to evaluate the 
chances of a successful flowering of this fragile new state into a democracy.
In order to gain a more complete view of the scope of the problems and their 
potential solutions in post-revolutionary Romania, it is necessary to look at the 
antecedents to the revolution. Nicolae Ceausescu, the former dictator, came to 
power in communist Romania in 1965. Shortly thereafter he consolidated his 
power as supreme leader and ruled virtually without internal opposition until the 
revolution of December 1989.
Although some commentators now feel that Ceausescu was not a bad leader 
at the beginning of his rule,3 the historical verdict will probably be that “absolute 
power corrupted absolutely”. Human rights abuses in Romania were rampant 
throughout the 1970s and 80s. A snapshot of human rights abuses, written in the 
last months before the revolution, was prepared by the staff of the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.4 Revolt Against Silence begins with a quote
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from Romanian dissident poet Mircea Dinescu:
Not only are basic human rights disregarded in Romania, but even the institutions 
that are supposed to defend them ... the judiciary and the press ... have become 
instruments of intimidation and terror against the population.
It’s an absurd land where the border guards point their weapons towards their own 
country, where wheat is harvested on television but rots in the fields, where 
workers are called "proprietors" so that they can be made to buy what the 
Constitution says is rightfully theirs ...5
Revolt Against Silence records massive violations of civil, political, social, 
cultural, and economic rights. It categorizes the Ceausescu régime’s attitude 
towards human rights and humanitarian values as “contemptuous”, and the 
country as “a nightmare world”.6 Among the worst of the violations was the 
policy of “systematization”, the systematic razing of rural towns and villages in 
order for the government to reconstruct “agro-industrial centres”.7 This program 
of forced deportation of rural people to different parts of the country produced 
grave cultural and historic loss, and economic havoc.
The situation of women under the Ceausescu regime was abhorrent. Birth 
control was denied to any woman under 40 (later 45) years old who had fewer 
than four living children.8 This policy produced a plethora of butchered back­
room abortions, family hardship and a demotion of the position of women in 
society.9 The results today are seen in the enormous number of orphans and 
abandoned children in Romania and the serious problem of childhood AIDS 
(Romania has the highest rate of childhood AIDS in Europe).10
Religious groups were highly regulated and controlled by the State. Priests 
were continually beaten and harassed, believers were demoted at their jobs, many
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churches were destroyed, and a barrage of religious hatred permeated the press.11 
Freedom of association was an illusion during the Ceausescu régime (permits were 
required for assemblies), thus, even if the state allowed services at some churches, 
believers were unable either to engage in gatherings outside of the Sunday service 
or perform any social ministering.12 Protesting pastors had their licenses revoked, 
and the state so closely controlled the finances of individual churches (by requiring 
that a “competent authority” sign a cheque) that a church found itself unable to 
operate if its pastor was unlicensed.13
Officials in communist Romania proudly touted the “right to work” as 
indicative of respect for human rights in Romania. However, according to Revolt 
Against Silence this right was actually an obligation. Romania had laws against 
“parasitism” under which the unemployed were criminally prosecuted.14 The 
state regulated wages, and it ensured through a system of earnings tied to 
unrealistically high production quotas that workers never actually received the 
remuneration they were promised. If workers were dissident in any way — 
including holding religious beliefs — they were given hazardous work or 
“corrective” labour. Any attempt at labour organization resulted in severe 
crackdowns by the Securitate, the secret police.15
The policies of the communist government towards ethnic minorities have 
been described as “cultural genocide”.16 Hungarians, Jews,17 and Romany (the 
Gypsies’ preferred term for themselves) were all persecuted. The worst off of 
these ethnic groups appears to have been the Hungarians.18 Revolt Against 
Silence spoke of beatings, disappearances, discrimination in employment and 
education, and cultural assimilation by means of forced relocations to ethnic 
Romanian areas (while ethnic Romanians were moved into the gaps left in the 
ethnic Hungarian communities). The Danubian Research Institute report spoke 
of the “Transylvanian Holocaust”19: the forced labour of 100,000 ethnic 
Hungarians in labour camps and the alleged perishing of 40,000 of them.
nRevolt Against Silence, supra, note 4 at 16-17. 
nIbid. at 18. 
nIbid. at 19.
147bid. at 12.
^Ibid. at 13.
16SeeT. Gilberg, “Ethnic Minorities in Romania under Socialism” (1974) 7:4 East European Quarterly 
435 for one account.
17See supra, note 3 at chapter 6, “The Romanian Jews”, for an account of their persecution.
18See Genocide in Transylvania: Nation on the Death Row (Astor, Florida: Transylvanian World 
Federation and Danubian Research Center, 1985).
l9Ibid. at 56.
“Expressing discontent, telling a political joke or listening to foreign broadcasts 
were sufficient causes to be sent to the canal [a “concentration camp” on the 
Danube delta].”20
Accounts of persecution of the Romany are now also well-documented.21 
Bar any summarizes the situation of this much-persecuted people under Communist 
régimes:
In the Post-World War II states of Eastern Europe the unwavering determination 
of many Gypsies to maintain their traditional lifestyles [of nomadism] constituted 
a daring defiance of communist power, which was intent on shaping the ideal of 
the “new socialist man,” the epitome of conformity. Moreover, the Gypsies’ 
prominent status in virtually all statistics on crime, unemployment, illiteracy, and 
other negative social phenomena served to make them even less popular with the 
leaders and populations of the socialist states.22
Ian Hancock, one of the world’s foremost scholars of Romany culture, tells of 
50 Romany being shot and killed by border guards after having been turned back 
to Romania at the Hungarian border in 1989. Others were apparently wounded 
in similar incidents at the [former] Yugoslav border.23 Another account quoted 
by Hancock is of Romany being first starved and then brutalized by Ceausescu’s 
militia: “We were stripped naked, our legs and hands were tied and we were 
made to lean on a table. Then they beat our backs using a rubber hose with iron 
nuts which they had taken from a tractor.”24
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there were strong underground movements 
of dissent in Poland and the former Czechoslovakia.25 In Romania, however,
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there was virtually no underground protest movement until late in 1988. The 
reason for this can be found in the Romanian government’s complete silencing of 
any dissenting voices. Revolt Against Silence quotes a Bucharest dissident as saying 
that “a very large number of Romanian intellectuals don’t do anything because 
they can’t.”26 Dissent was minimized by economic sanctions, by the stripping of 
the dignity and culture of Romanian citizens through the policy of systemization, 
and by the dreaded Securitate’s arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, torture, and 
killings. Censorship was rife and emigration was tightly controlled to prevent any 
remaining dissent from leaking beyond the borders.
As a result of this absolute internal crackdown, it was only too easy for the 
international community to turn a blind eye to internal Romanian policies. 
Ceausescu’s public denunciation of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
made him an instant hero with the west. They perceived him as a benevolent 
dictator, and they mistook the lack of an underground movement in Romania 
(such as always existed in most of the other eastern European Soviet-bloc states) 
as a sign of the overwhelming support of his people.27 During the Ceausescu 
régime, the international community for the most part reacted very favourably to 
Romania. Foreign heads of state received Ceausescu with full honours as an 
equal. In the final analysis, one must blame Western leaders’ willingness to 
accept, nay, welcome, Ceausescu into their ranks in the 1960s, 70s, and early 80s 
on the widely held view of the time that absolute state sovereignty was the 
cornerstone of international law.
Romania was a vigourous proponent of the principle of state sovereignty. An 
analysis of Romania’s view of international law and international relations is 
presented in R. Weiner’s article, “Romania and International Law at the United 
Nations”.28 Weiner described Romania’s philosophy of international law: “[T]he 
purpose of international law is to guarantee the national sovereignty of members 
of the international community.”29 Weiner said, “The Romanians view[ed]
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international organizations as the creatures of sovereign States. International 
organizations are formed by States on the basis of the free will of their members. 
... [I]n no instance is an international organization to assume the attributes of a 
world government ...”.30
The Romanian government under Ceausescu was an active proponent of 
efforts to fully codify international law, to reflect, it hoped, “a set of ethical and 
cultural values superior to and more equitable than the value system of capitalist 
international law.”31 At the U.N. in 1974, Romania voted for the adoption of a 
charter on the economic rights and duties of states. The Romania delegate’s 
speech praised the proposed charter for expressing: “the legitimate hopes of those 
peoples which sought to abolish the old structures of the world economy based on 
exploitation and domination and to replace them with a new international 
economic order based on the equality of all States.”32
According to Nastase in 1976 at the U.N. Romania proposed a Universal Code 
of Conduct for States to:
[cjreate favourable conditions for the unabated observation of the norms and 
institutions of international law construed as a homogeneous body of democratic 
rules adapted to the new requirements of a steadily changing world so as to serve 
the people’s aspirations for peace, justice and progress.33
Weiner talked idealistically of Romania’s international contributions to “a 
more ethical world cultural system” and more “progressive” international laws34 
and its calling for “international morality and ethics”.35 This article, written in 
1983 by a professor at the University of Massachusetts, is yet another illustration 
of the deference with which the Ceausescu régime was treated by the West into 
the mid 1980s.
It was not until after 1985 that the outside world began to be more aware of 
human rights abuses in Romania.36 At the same time, the movement of dissent 
in Romania was at last gaining some ground. Events elsewhere in Europe in the 
1980s, notably in Poland, could not be kept forever from Romanian intellectuals.
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In 1988 Ceausescu renounced his country’s “most-favoured nation” status with the 
U.S., just as the U.S. was about to suspend it over human rights violations.37 In 
August of 1988 Doina Cornea courageously wrote an open letter to President 
Ceausescu complaining of the systemization program. In the following months 
other voices of opposition joined in the letter-writing. Some were arrested, some 
placed under surveillance; one was charged with “illegally trafficking in coffee” and 
“treated” at a psychiatric hospital. In March of 1989, Mircea Dinescu published 
an interview (quoted, supra, note 5) in the French magazine Libération. The U.N. 
Human Rights Commission condemned Romania in March of 1989.38 But 
before the international community fully woke up to the magnitude of the 
atrocities, the December revolution occurred.
Nineteen-eightynine has been called the year of the Velvet Revolutions. In 
Poland, in former Czechoslovakia, in Hungary and in Germany, revolution came 
and communist governments were overthrown with barely any bloodshed. The 
situation in Romania was completely different. The uprising began on 14 
December 1989 in Timosoaura. By 21 December it had spread to Bucharest. The 
Ceausescus were captured on 23 December and executed after a summary trial on 
25 December. The number of lives lost in the revolution was in the thousands.39
Initial world reaction was that, because of the level of atrocities of the 
Communist régime and the almost total silencing of protest for so long, Romania 
stood the least chance of all the Eastern European nations of successfully 
flowering into a full democracy based on the rule of law.40 The first indication 
of the difficulties that lay ahead was the provisional government’s response to 
international accusations of lack of due process in the execution of the Ceausescus.
The tribunal that tried Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu was a military one. The 
only civilians were the two defense lawyers, recruited “not from any particular 
brilliance of reputation but purely from the expedient reality that they lived in the 
residential area ... that is adjacent to the grounds of the Ministry of Defense.”41
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Both defense lawyers wore tri-coloured arm bands, “openly signalling their 
solidarity with the revolution”.42
The charges against the Ceausescus were the genocide of more than 64,000 
victims, the organization of armed rebellion against the people and the state, the 
destruction of public assets and buildings, the sabotage of the national economy, 
and the attempt to flee the country with more than a billion dollars deposited in 
foreign banks.43 The Ceausescus denied all the charges, refused to recognize 
their defense lawyers, and demanded to be tried before the Grand National 
Assembly (Ceausescu’s hand-picked parliament). This request was refused, and 
the trial proceeded. It was videotaped by a Colonel of the Romanian army. No 
witnesses testified; no proof was presented. The questions put to the Ceausescus 
amounted to a string of accusations such as “Why did you mistreat the peasants?” 
After 40 minutes of questioning, the tribunal pronounced the inevitable guilty 
verdict. Then, strangely, one of the defense lawyers rose and gave a speech 
acknowledging the guilt of his “client”:
They have therefore been tried here as ordinary citizens, and the norms of legality 
have been observed for this ... It is an error for the two accused not to accept 
defense ... If this were not a legal process, we would have been first to say so. 
They [the Ceausescus] refer to the constitution, but they do not know its contents.
The tribunal was and is legally constituted.44
According to Kozinski (a U.S. superior court judge of Romanian origin), it is 
the conduct of the defense lawyers that is the fatal flaw in the proceeding as far 
as its legality is concerned:
The Romanian government has made no excuse for the manner in which the so- 
called trial was conducted. It has not repudiated the proceedings as contrary to 
law and good conscience or taken any action against the perpetrators.... A rash act 
in the midst of crisis might be excused: a deliberative proceeding that has the 
trappings -  but none of the substance -  of legality is an affront to the legal 
order.45
Almost immediately after the execution of the Ceausescus, the provisional 
government outlawed the death penalty in early January 1990.46 The National 
Salvation Front could have openly admitted that the process under which the 
Ceausescus were executed was unlawful, or it could have excused this as necessary 
at a time when counter-revolutionaries were threatening the existence of the
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tenuous new government. To try instead to pass it off as a legally proper criminal 
execution plainly hurt the new government’s credibility.
The political and social problems faced by the new government have been 
legion; the riots of 1990, the conflict between revolutionary leaders Iliescu and 
Roman, and the election as President of the enormously popular communist- 
affiliated Iliescu twice (in May of 1990 and in September of 1992) have all left 
doubts in world opinion as to whether the Romanian people are capable of 
democracy. The political situation lends itself to speculation that the people of 
Romania have followed blindly for so long that what comes the most naturally to 
them is to continue simply blindly following new leaders.47 Indeed, the lack of 
public objection to the sub-standard performance of Prime Minister Vacaroiu’s 
left-wing minority government in 1993 “prompted some analysts to speak of 
Romanian society’s having relapsed into a political apathy reminiscent of the 
communist era”.48
The legal problems faced by the new government with respect to improving 
the country’s human rights record are also formidable. In order to develop a legal 
framework capable of supporting human rights Romania first needed a new 
constitution spelling out its political and judicial institutions, and the protections 
to be granted to its citizens by its government.
Under the old constitution of 1965, “The PCR [Romanian Communist Party] 
and the Ceausescu régime placed a far greater emphasis on order than on the rule 
of law.”49 According to Bachman, the constitution of 1965 bore a superficial 
resemblance to the constitutions of Western democracies. Among the theoretically 
guaranteed rights were: equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnic origin 
(Article 17), freedom of association (Article 27), freedom of speech (Article 28), 
and freedom of conscience and religion (Article 30). However, an override clause 
provided that no citizen could exercise his or her rights when they conflicted with 
the socialist order, nor if the result of that exercise would be “hostile to the 
interests of the Romanian working people”.50 These latter “interests” were
47See M. Shafir, “Romanian Elections: Why the Democratic Convention Lost” (1992) 1:43 Radio Free 
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defined solely by the ruling régime, effectively taking away any force the human 
rights provisions of the constitution might otherwise have had.51
What legal foundations existed for human rights in Communist Romania were 
further undermined by the fashion in which the judiciary was controlled by the 
government. Under the judicial system of the Communist régime, judges were 
appointed by the Party and took their orders from the Ministry of the Interior, the 
department largely responsible for the greatest number of human rights abuses. 
“Under the Constitution, it [the court system] was charged with defending the 
socialist order, protecting individual rights, and reeducating those who violate[d] 
the country’s laws, in that order of precedence.”52 Many professional judicial 
functions were given to ordinary citizens, who were chosen and tutored by the 
party. These “popular” judges formed “working peoples’ judicial councils” to take 
charge of complaints and presumably to maintain order, if not law.53
To distance itself from the old régime, the post-revolutionary government had 
drafted a new constitution by the summer of 1991. This was debated in the 
Constituent Assembly in September. After consideration of over 1000 
amendments, a final constitution with 152 articles was approved. On 9 December 
1991, the amended version was ratified by the electorate in a referendum. 
Constitutional advisors included American Bill of Rights experts54 and 
commissioners from the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy Through 
Law.55
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The new constitution has been criticized as being too long.56 However, the 
justification is that, with a history of massive human rights abuses, a detailed 
constitution is necessary to establish judicial legitimacy.57 The constitution spells 
out the role of the media; radio and television stations must be autonomous, grant 
equal air time to “important social and political groups” and be “dvically 
responsible”.58 Censorship “of any kind” is prohibited. The new constitution 
allows for the greater protection of civil liberties than the 1965 constitution by 
providing, in Article 16, that “no-one is above the law”. Article 23, consisting of 
several clauses outlining civil and political rights, specifies house search, detention 
and imprisonment to be among the conduct of government which is allowed only 
in circumstances “determined by law and in accordance with established legal 
procedures”. Freedom of conscience and religion are again spelled out (in Article 
29), this time with an express prohibition on activities that promote hostility 
between people and groups of different faiths. The teaching of religion in schools 
is also constitutionally guaranteed. Moreover, individual freedom, personal 
security, freedom of expression, private ownership and freedom of association are 
expressed to be “inviolable”. This ought to alleviate the problem found in the 
previous constitution whereby rights could be over-ridden when they conflicted 
with the goals of the state.
The new constitution requires that judges be “independent, being answerable 
to the law alone”.59 Romania claimed in 1990 to have removed 90% of the 
presidents of county tribunals and almost 200 other judges of the Ceausescu 
régime. Only 20% of the judges appointed by the former government to the High 
Court of Justice remained by July of 1991, and these were said to have exhibited 
“irreproachable behaviour” during the Ceausescu era.60 On the constitutional 
court, one third of the nine members are replaced every year. Two major 
criticisms of the new judicial system have been the provision in the Constitution for 
the demotion of judges,61 and the lack of life tenure for judges.62
In spite of its lofty goals, the new Constitution provides some windows of 
opportunity for a return to dictatorship. The new constitution still leaves too much
56See Schwartz, supra, note 54 at 97, and M. Shafir, “Romania: Constitution Approved in 
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power in the hands of the president. True to Romania’s communist history, the 
president is also the chief of the armed forces and president of the defense 
council. He may dissolve parliament under certain circumstances and may 
unilaterally (after a non-binding parliamentary consultation) declare a state of 
siege or emergency.® The only parliamentary limit on these presidential powers 
are articles, added in the September 1991 parliamentary debates, allowing a two- 
thirds majority of the two chambers of parliament to “indict the president for high 
treason”.64
While some human rights are said to be inviolable, others are subject to 
limitation by the government in circumstances of “natural disaster or calamity of 
grave proportions” or to safeguard “national security”.65 Presumably to balance 
these limitations, the constitution provides that “where there are discrepancies 
between domestic laws and international agreements regarding fundamental 
human rights, the latter should take precedence.”66 This proviso is potentially of 
great importance given the international agreements to which Romania is now a 
signatory, but it is not yet clear how it will play out.
Minority rights continue to be a serious problem in post-revolutionary 
Romania. Romanian national chauvinism re-emerged quickly after the initial rush 
of goodwill produced by the revolution. It is troubling to read a summary of the 
minority situation in Romania as described in Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 1990:
Romanians live under a government that generally respects the fundamental 
liberties of the individual. The government took several positive steps in 1991...
On the other hand, severe discrimination against Gypsies, a problem endemic to 
the region, was in evidence in Romania as well. ... Although ethnic Hungarians 
enjoy broad legal and cultural rights, historical tensions between ethnic Hungarians 
and Romanians persisted; anti-Semitism surfaced in ultranationalist publications. 
Extremist groups, espousing nationalism and authoritarianism, if reinforced by 
populist discontent with market-oriented economic reforms, could constitute a 
threat to the country’s fledgling democratic institutions.67
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Some minority rights that had been drafted into the July 1991 version of the 
constitution were retracted in subsequent amendments.68 Political allies of an 
anti-Hungarian nationalist organization exerted their influence to have certain 
sections guaranteeing minority rights struck down in the parliamentary debate. As 
a result, Romanian was declared the only official language, with members of ethnic 
minorities guaranteed an interpreter for a court appearance only if their command 
of the Romanian language is insufficient for the purpose. Minority cultural rights 
are guaranteed only vaguely with the grant of the “right to a separate identity”.69 
Hungary abstained in the 1993 vote on Romania's admission to the Council of 
Europe in protest over Romania’s treatment of its Hungarian minority.70
The Hungarian minority is not the only ethnic minority experiencing continued 
problems in the new Romania. Romania has the highest number of Romany of 
any European nation. According to Bar any and Hancock, the situation of the 
Romany in Eastern Europe is in some ways worse under democratic governments 
than it had been under the Communists.71 In Romania, the situation of Romany 
has deteriorated since 1989. Pavel, social and political editor of 22, a Romanian 
opinion journal, stated bluntly, “[Tlhe/re being persecuted more brazenly and 
brutally than before.”72 Some of this escalating violence against the Romany may 
be explained by a widespread popular belief among ethnic Romanians that 
Romany were accorded favour by Ceausescu. It was rumoured (apparently falsely) 
that Ceausescu himself was Romany. Some Romany apparently believed this, for 
they nicknamed the dictator “our Daddy”. After Ceausescu’s fall from power, it 
was popularly said that his Romany origin accounted for his corruption.73
Prime Minister Roman in 1990 denounced the Romany, tarring them with one 
brush as “leaders of prostitutes and the world of the underground”.74 A 1990 
editorial in the national newspaper Romania Mare (Great Romania) was blatantly
68See Shafir, supra, note 56 at 51.
69Ibid. at 52. The right to preservation and development of these identities would have given ethnic 
minorities much stronger legal rights, such as are included in the Charter of Paris, discussed infra, 
notes 87-93 and the accompanying text.
7aThe Hungarian minority’s situation is described in detail in D. Ionescu & AA. Reisch, “Still no 
Breakthrough in Romanian-Hungarian relations” (1993) 2:42 Radio Free Europe Research Report 26 
and in M. Shafir & AA. Reisch, eds., “Roundtable: Transylvania’s Past and Future” (1993) 2:24 Radio 
Free Europe Research Report 26.
^  Supra, notes 22 and 23 at 410.
72See Pavel, supra, note 10 at 12.
^Ibid. at 13.
racist, saying that “some people will have to leave the country fast, and of course 
it won’t be the Romanians.”75
According to Pavel, the miners’ attack of June 1990, initially directed at 
demonstrating students, later turned into a pogrom against Romany;
[The miners] accompanied by their civilian guides (typically Securitate members)
-  suddenly appeared at the doorsteps of Gypsy homes. Men who were found 
inside were subjected to rapid executions; some of them had their heads cut off 
with a single swipe of the sickle. Women were beaten and raped in front of their 
horrified children and parents, who were themselves tortured in an attempt to 
force them to reveal hidden merchandise destined for the black market. Some 
men and women were tied by the hands and feet and lifted onto trucks that took 
them to unknown destinations. Many never returned.76
This tragedy, asserts Pavel, dispelled a longstanding myth: “the idealized historical 
and literary image of Romanians as a peaceful and hospitable people incapable of 
racism, anti-Semitism, chauvinism, and nationalism.”77 At the establishment of 
the European Romany Parliament (EUROM) in 1991, a report was released 
stating that during 1990 “the brutalizing, rape, incarceration and murder of 
Gypsies [in Romania] were monthly occurrences.”78
lonescu and Shafir, commentators on Romanian affairs for the Radio Free 
Europe Research Institute, note that:
Hungarian-Romanian tension notwithstanding, the two ethnic communities seemed 
to have common ground on at least one point: their animosity towards the Gypsies.
In September [1993] a mob of Romanians and Hungarians killed three Gypsies and 
burned down a dozen or so Gypsy houses in the Transylvanian village of Hadareni, 
in what the International Federation of Human Rights termed “a veritable 
pogrom”. The ambiguity of the government’s press release on the incident, which 
seemed to place the blame equally on the victims and the culprits, determined the 
Gypsies’ representatives on the Council of National Minorities to announce that 
they were withdrawing from it as well. [The Council had been formed in March of 
1993 as part of Romania’s quest to gain admission to the Council of Europe, but
75Quoted in Barany, supra, note 22 at 44.
76Pavel, supra, note 10 at 12.
77Ibid.
nSupra, note 23 at 411, quoting from N. Gheorghe and I. Hancock, “Report of the International 
Romani Union on the Current Situation of Roma Throughout the World” (Manchaca, Texas: 
International World Romani Union, 1991) [emphasis on human rights violations in Romania]. See 
alsoH. Cartner, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Persecution of Gypsies in Romania (NewYork: Helsinki 
Watch, 1991).
a Hungarian group had already withdrawn in protest of the government’s failure
to implement the Council of Minorities’ recommendations.]79
The present government justifies its ethnic harassment as an attempt to 
eradicate the black market. However, Pavel sees it as pure racism, fed by extreme 
nationalist sentiment in the wake of the revolution. Whatever the cause, violence 
against Romany is commonplace, and the police seem unable or unwilling to stop 
it.
In October of 1992 Germany announced that it planned to expel a great 
number of its refugee Romany population back to Romania. The deportation was 
labelled the “reinsertion program” by the government.80 This was not a new 
story; it had been brewing since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, when, according 
to Hancock, West Germany took action against the Romany to make room for the 
flood of East German refugees. When the U.S. House of Representatives 
protested, Chancellor Helmut Kohl responded that “the federal [German] 
government does not deem it necessary or expedient to introduce special rules for 
this category of persons [the Romany] whose situation cannot be compared with 
that of East German refugees.”81
Today, according to Barany, most Romany have abandoned their nomadic 
lifestyle. However, with the growing tide of racism even in the Western European 
countries such as Germany, the “Romany problem” could become Eastern 
Europe’s largest refugee crisis of the 1990s, as the Romany try to find a homeland 
where their distinctive culture will find acceptance. Romania, given its new 
theoretical acceptance of international principles of human rights, may have no 
choice but to “welcome” them back; it may be in breach of international law if it 
does not.82 Romania will need international moral and financial support to 
combat the social disruption that will result from any large-scale Romany 
immigration.
Bednarczyk believes that dealing with the volatile area of minority rights will 
be the key to maintaining democracy and security in Eastern Europe.83 To
79Supra, note 37 at 126. See also M. Shafir, “Minorities’ Council Raises Questions” (1993) 2:24 
RFE/RL Research Report 35.
“ i. Foneska, “Of No Fixed Abode” (book review of A. Fraser, The Gypsies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)), 
Times Literary Supplement (29 January 1993) 7.
Supra, note 23 at 409.
“ it can forcefully be argued that by expelling all or a part of its Gypsy population Germany is in 
breach of international and regional refugee conventions and in breach of the principle of self- 
determination of peoples enshrined in the U.N. Charter.
“ “Nationalism, Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights in Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe”, 
Occasional Paper No. 2, Nato Defence College, Rome, Italy, 1994 at 2.
implement real protection for the Hungarian and Gypsy minorities it will be 
necessary for Romania to add constitutional guarantees of separate schools and 
other civil and cultural rights for these ethnic groups. More important, the 
international community must help to purge R o m anian society of ethnocentric, 
ultranationalist and racist views through condemnation of these attitudes, through 
education towards tolerance, acceptance, and welcoming of diversity, and through 
continued monitoring of the human rights situation. As Fruling comments:
If we do not scrutinize violations that seem minor in comparison to what happened 
in the near past we will not be able to build a strong democratic and human rights 
abiding culture... This requires a policy or rejection -  of denunciation -  of abuses, 
and reaction to actions that violate or infringe upon human rights. Furthermore, 
it requires a policy that goes towards proposing alternatives and getting things 
done.84
On the international scene, Romania was slower than the other countries of 
Eastern Europe to gain admittance to the Council of Europe, the pre-eminent 
European body of states and defender of human rights.85 However, like the 
other emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, it used its membership in the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (which had been 
formed during the Cold War in an early effort towards detente) as a stepping 
stone towards full membership in the Council.
The first summit meeting of the CSCE was in 1975, when it adopted the 
Helsinki Final Act, an optimistic call for the acceptance of human rights standards 
into international law. However, the signatures of the Soviet-bloc states did not 
guarantee an intention on the part of those states to follow the spirit of the Act, 
and, as NATO security analyst Buguslawa Bednarczyk points out, Ceausescu in 
particular signed the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document with the reservation that 
his country would not be bound by any clause it considered objectionable.86
mH. Fruling, Remarks, supra, note 1 979 at 980 and 982.
85Beginning in the 1950s, Western European countries, impatient with the long process of obtaining 
an internationally ratified treatjron human rights through the U.N., had formed the Council of Europe 
and proclaimed their own treaties on human rights, first the European Convention for the Protection 
of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, then the European Social Charter of 1961, guaranteeing 
social, economic, and cultural rights, and then the European Convention on Human Rights of 1963. 
The Convention, one of the most successful international treaties on human rights, guarantees 
fundamental civil and political rights and mandates a remedy at the national level, “notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity” (Article 13). Three 
bodies are authorized to ensure the enforcement of this treaty: the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
Rights. An optional protocol allows individuals to bring a suit before the European Court of Human 
Rights.
QjC
Supra, note 83 at 18.
By 1990 the entire Eastern European situation had changed. In November of 
that year the CSCE, in a wave of democratic enthusiasm, issued the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, a major international legal document, to mark the 
beginning of “a new era of democracy, peace and unity” in Europe. The Charter 
of Paris begins with poetic words of optimism:
We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at 
a time of profound change and historic expectations ...
Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and 
women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the 
Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace, and unity in 
Europe.
Ours is a time of fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished 
for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and 
equal security for all our countries ...
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthrights of all human beings, 
are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the 
first responsibility of government. Respect for them is an essential safeguard 
against an over-mighty State. Their observance and full exercise are the 
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace.87
The Charter of Paris goes on to declare that freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief, freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful 
assembly, freedom of movement, protection from arbitrary arrest, detention, 
torture, and other cruel and degrading punishment, the right to fair and public 
trials, the right to political participation, the right to own property, the right to 
enjoy economic, social and cultural rights, and the rights of ethnic minorities to the 
protection, preservation, and development of their identities are all necessary 
components of the new Europe. The Charter of Paris spells out principles of 
economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility. It stresses 
friendly relations among states and a commitment to settling disputes by peaceful 
means. To this end it entreats reductions of armed forces among signatory states. 
Significantly for Romania, given its past opposition to expanding the influence of 
international bodies, the treaty “recognize[s] with satisfaction the growing role of 
the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness, fostered by the 
improvement in relations among our States.”88
The CSCE since 1989 has been affiliated with the Council of Europe through 
various working parties formed to exchange views of human rights issues. The 
Council of Europe requires that states seeking membership must first ratify the
^CSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain 
Provisions of the Charter, (1991) 30 I.L.M. 190 at 193-194, [hereinafter Charter of Paris].
88Charter of Paris, ibid. at 198.
European Convention on Human Rights. After the events of 1989, when many of 
the former East Bloc countries expressed a desire to ratify the Convention in order 
to join the Council of Europe, the Council considered the state of advancement 
of the particular state along the road to democracy and the rule of law before 
making a decision on whether to admit that state to the Council.89 On 21 
February 1991, the former Czechoslovakia was admitted to the Council of Europe, 
and on 6 November 1991, Poland was admitted. In Madrid in February 1991, 
Ministers of the Council of Europe affirmed their desire to develop cooperation 
with Romania as it progresses on the path to democratic reform, in view of its 
eventual entry into the Council of Europe.
In addition to its subscription to the Charter of Paris, in 1990 and 1991 
Romania subscribed to the United National protocol on the abolishment of the 
death penalty and the United Nations convention on the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and removed its reservation concerning the 
obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court.90 In February of 1992, the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights decided that Romania had 
advanced sufficiently towards fulfilling the goals enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that it was no longer necessary to monitor human 
rights in that country through a special rapporteur.91 Finally, on October 4 1993, 
Romania was admitted as a full member of the Council of Europe.
In Oslo, Norway in November of 1991, the CSCE held a seminar in 
accordance with provisions contained in the Charter of Paris in which 
representatives of all member states, including Romania, jointly tabled a report on 
“Practical measures to Strengthen Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law”, 
“Constitutional Reforms”, “Strengthening CSCE Cooperation in Human Rights, 
Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law”, and “Proposals for Cooperation” 
[regarding, inter alia, training, education, NGO participation, and free legal aid].92 
At the Oslo seminar, the representatives recalled their commitment to the 
principles of the Charter of Paris and had full and frank discussions on
^Countries that accede to conventions of the Council of Europe can, even before they gain the status 
of full membership, participate in relevant Council activities. For example, Romania acceded to the 
European Cultural Convention on 19 December 1991, and has since that date participated in all 
Council activities in the areas of education, culture, sport and youth, Council of Europe Information 
Sheet on Human Rights No. 29 (Strasbourg, 1992) at 76.
90Supra, Shafir, note 25 at 35.
9lIbid. at 37-38.
92“ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Report to the CSCE Council From the CSCE 
Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions” (1992) 31 I.L.M. 374 at 374, hereinafter the Oslo 
report.
“suggestions for practical measures to strengthen democratic institutions and the 
rule of law.”93
The Oslo report engaged in a general discussion of the independence of the 
judiciary as a fundamental element in “safeguarding the rule of law and securing 
effective implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”94 The 
judiciary must have its role strengthened in a new democracy, said the report, be 
well-trained, and with appropriate appointment procedures, remuneration, and 
security of office.95 In addition, plurality of political parties, electoral systems, 
and the role of NGOs and trade unions were also listed as methods through which 
the rule of law could be more securely implemented.
With regards to constitutional reform, the consensus in the Oslo seminar was 
that, “[a]s long as the core values of democratic government were assured, no 
single overall approach to the institutions and procedures of democratic 
government could be considered as having universal validity.”96 However, the 
report reiterated the “urgent need” to make a break with previous totalitarian 
systems “in an appropriate legal form”.97 The Oslo report warned the developing 
democracies that “a decision on a definitive new constitution, adopted before a 
society has fully clarified and developed its vision of democratic government, might 
have to be reconsidered before long.”98
Vital to the Oslo seminar’s consensus is the Oslo report’s discussion of 
national implementation of international human rights instruments. Various 
options for signatory states were left open, including incorporation or 
transformation of international instruments as national legislation. “[I]t was 
emphasized that it was the responsibility of each State to give full domestic effect 
to its international human rights obligations, irrespective of the means of 
implementation chosen.”99
Domestic legal remedies for violations of human rights were given an 
important place on the agenda of the seminar. The availability of the ordinary
”lbid. at 376.
^Ibid at 377.
^Ibid. at 380. These latter traits of a truly independent judiciary are arguable still lacking in the new 
Romania, as can be seen by the allegations of Romana Libera, infra, note 107, and the discussion 
supra, notes 59 to 62 and the accompanying text.
^Ibid. at 378.
91 Ibid. at 379.
98Ibid.
99Ibid. at 384.
court system, including administrative courts, as well as constitutional courts, 
human rights commissions, ombudspersons and mediators were all suggested as 
effective methods to control human rights abuses.100 The conference noted that 
recourse for individuals to international human rights bodies would complement 
domestic systems of remedies. Finally, the Oslo report dealt with the future role 
of the CSCE in the areas of human rights, developing democracies, and the rule 
of law.101
The Oslo report talks of the development of the rule of law in a new 
democracy as being premised on many factors. However, the report recognizes 
that the phenomenon of a “democratic culture” is the single most important factor 
in the evolution of a society that follows and will continue to follow the rule of 
law:
When a democratic tradition of long duration has not had the chance to develop, 
or had been interrupted, it would be necessary to develop a democratic culture, on 
the local, regional and national level, in order to sustain new democratic 
institutions ... The growth of a democratic culture can be fostered by society at 
many levels: in basic dvic education, in the media, within religious and civic 
movements and organizations, in political parties, in the professions, notably the 
legal profession, in the judiciary, in public administration, within the armed forces 
and the police by securing the absolute allegiance to the civil power and 
democratic government.102
In the early post-revolutionary period in Romania there was unfortunately little 
public discussion within Romania of the elements necessary for the 
implementation of a state based on the rule of law. According to Shafir the 
situation in 1992 was that:
since the removal of the Ceausescu, theoretical discussions concerning the concept 
of a state based on the rule of law have been extremely rare in both specialist 
journals and in the popular press; and it is also no surprise that there has been a 
similar neglect of the relationship between the rule of law and political culture, 
which affects the former’s translation into practice.103
Shafir went on to note that although the popular press in the immediate post­
revolutionary period was not devoid of discussions of the component elements of 
a state based on the rule of law, such as democratic institutions, there was a 
singular lack of “theoretical elucidations of the concept of the constitutional 
state”.104 One notable exception to this paucity of debate was an article by
mIbid. at 385.
mIbid. at 386-8.
l02Ibid. at 377. See also Peter Hogg’s comments, supra, note 51.
m Supra, Shafir, 25 at 34.
mIbid.
Teofil Pop, President of the High Court of Justice from July 1990 until June 1992, 
published in December of 1990. Pop emphasized that, in a state based on the rule 
of law, the individual occupied the centre of political and social life, and that the 
Romanian people must begin to view the state as existing to serve the interests of 
individuals.105 Pop said that the state must be governed by legislation that treats 
“the protection of the individual, of his rights and his dignity, as axiomatic”.106 
When this condition is fulfilled, according to Pop, “popular sovereignty, the 
separation of the branches of power, and a democratic, pluralist system” would 
result.107
However, the paucity of writings on the rule of law is beginning to be 
alleviated as time advances and growing confidence permits. Recognizing that 
post-communist lawyers, politicians and citizens need advice on the nuts and bolts 
of the implementation of democracy and the protection of human rights, Shafir 
addressed the necessity for the development of a “civic political culture”,108 and 
stressed its vital role in the transformation of the theory of the rule of law into 
practice. The elements of this culture, Shafir states, are “a “participatory” 
approach to politics (individuals’ involvement in political life) rather than a 
“subject” [approach] (acceptance of the uncontrolled right of rulers to establish 
the norms of the polity).”109 The concept of a “civic political culture”, or 
“democratic culture”, contains within itself an exhortation for the active 
involvement of all citizens that is so necessary for the true implementation of the 
rule of law.110
mIbid. at 35.
l06Ibid. at 35.
1V7Ibid. Ironically, for all his concern with the rule of law and democratic theory, Pop’s appointment 
as Chief Justice was not renewed by the parliament in 1992 because of his alleged close collaboration 
with the former régime. In March of 1992 the daily newspaper Romana Libera published a “Moral 
Profile” in which it claimed that Pop had been one of the nomenclature, hand-picked by Elena 
Ceausescu, and had been in charge of the entire [corrupt] process of legal adjudication (ibid., at 38).
lwIbid. at 34.
lC9Ibid. He went on to state that it is ironic that, to date, the best discussion of the concept of a 
political culture was made by Ovidiu Trasnea, “a sociologist and a political scientist known for his 
propagandist output under the former régime.”
110In contrast to this practical approach see K.E. Klare’s article, “Legal Theory and Democratic 
Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989” (1991) 25 U.B.C L. Rev. 69. In this highly theoretical treatise 
the author considers two approaches to legal discourse on human rights that post-communist lawyers 
may take: the technical, and the creative. The technical, Klare argues at p. 72, is flawed in that it 
assumes that an exhaustive vision of democracy can be implemented by postcommunist lawyers if they 
follow an “array of rules and forms that together make up the legal structure of the market and 
human rights guarantees” with these all in turn founded upon the autonomous rule of law. The 
creative approach, according to Klare at 102, is the correct one: instead of a formula of rules and 
precedents, lawyers need to be ‘‘politically and morally engaged ... to create a new conception of 
legality.” Klare suggests that only with creative moral engagement will new and diverse visions of
Now what is necessary is simply time. Romania has already taken strides 
towards fulfilling its human rights obligations. Dialogue between interest groups 
is beginning to spring up. The Romanian Helsinki Committee, the League for the 
Defense of Human Rights (LDHR), the Prodemocracy Movement, the 16-21 
December Association, and the Romanian Association for Individual Liberty and 
Personal Privacy are all new NGOs. The Romanian Institute for Respect of 
Human Rights was established by the government in January of 1991.111 These 
organizations have been quick to point out to the new government when it has 
taken actions abridging human rights.112 The LDHR sent thousands of observers 
to polling stations for the local elections of February 1992. Shafir says:
Society’s contribution to the process of establishing a state based on the rule of law 
... has been quite impressive, particularly in view of its past passivity. Although 
such social “input” is restricted to a minority of the population, (as indeed is the 
case even in democracies that are long established), this minority has been quite 
active and is likely to become more so in the future.113
One of the very first successes of the new government was the reversal of the 
ban on birth control in early 1990.114 Other rectifications will be more complex. 
The functioning of Romania’s new judicial and penal system will determine 
whether Romania can live up to its civil and political rights obligations; Romania 
must attempt to resettle or otherwise compensate its citizens displaced by the 
Ceausescu policy of systemization in order to comply with international laws 
against arbitrary interference with family and home; churches must retain their 
newfound autonomy and believers must be given equal treatment in society before 
it can be said that Romania allows true freedom of religion; dissent must be 
tolerated even when this becomes uncomfortable for the new government or when 
the dissenters are vociferous in protesting the inevitable mistakes a new 
government will make; the high ideals with which Romania began its system of 
free elections113 must not be compromised; the unreasonable production quotas 
and sub-poverty-line wages of the old régime must be abandoned if the right to 
just and favourable conditions of work is to be achieved — the new government’s
democratic societies come into being.
Although Klare and Shafir may be trying to say the same thing, the writings of Shafir are more 
compelling and, in the final analysis, much more likely to be influential.
u lShafir, supra, note 25 at 39.
112U.S. Department of State, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1992 (Washington, 1993) 
noted that “respect for human rights continued to improve in 1992, particularly with regard to 
institutionalizing democratic principles and respect for human rights in Romania’s legal system and 
the conduct of generally free and fair elections” at 881.
113Shafir, supra, note 25 at 40.
ll4Ibid. at 1233.
115See M. Shafir, “Romania’s New Electoral Laws” (1992) 1:36 Radio Free Europe Research Report 24.
progress in alleviating the hardships suffered by workers will undoubtedly be 
closely monitored by newly formed trade unions.116
The social rights mandated by such international instruments as the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and by the Charter of Paris will be the most 
problematic to implement and maintain. According to the Covenant on Economic 
and Social Rights, Romania is only expected to provide social rights “in accordance 
with its resources”,117 however, these are presently very limited, particularly 
compared with the country’s vast social problems. In fact it is because present 
social conditions and the standard of living are so appalling in Romania (by 
Western standards) that the country may serve as a model of the human rights 
standards an emerging democracy is capable of providing.118
There will be many factors working both for and against Romania’s new 
democracy in the coming years. However, if the positive attitude evidenced by 
Romanian activists and by Romania’s new representatives at the CSCE and at the 
Council of Europe is indicative of what lies ahead, Romania will develop into a 
westem-style democracy. The chief role of the international community towards 
aiding the development of this fragile democracy is in providing moral and 
practical support to its democratic institutions, in educating Romanians with the 
aim of embedding a “democratic culture” in their character, and in continued 
monitoring and condemnation of human rights abuses. We should go into the 
future with optimism.
11&The summoning of miners to suppress dissent in June 1990 was clearly an illegitimate use of the 
trade union movement. It may be rationalized as a mistake by a provisional government in a time of 
political upheaval, but it has hurt the international credibility of Romania’s commitment to the new 
norms of international human rights law.
117 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22.
118See D. Ionescu, “Romania’s Winter of Shortages” (1993) 2:6 Radio Free Europe Research Report 
45 for a description of recent conditions in Romania. Ionescu suggests that it is economic hardship 
that poses the most severe threat to the continuation of democracy in Romania.
